The new Criminal Procedure Code and the Potential for New Corruption

Asis

Contributor

15 Apr 2026 · 10:04 15 April 2026 10:04 WIB 5 minutes reading time: 5 minutes 7 read

Does the new Criminal Procedure Code have the potential for corruption? A legal opinion on the loopholes of investigation monopoly & coercive measures without permits that threaten justice.

Revisi KUHAP berpotensi membuka celah praktik korupsi baru? Simak opini selengkapnya. (Source: AI Gemini, Redaksi Literasi Hukum Indonesia)

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Table of Contents

Investigation Monopoly and the Danger of Power Concentration
Coercive Measures Loopholes and Dark Spaces Without Court Permission
Crisis of Supervision and Political Intervention

The birth of the new Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) on November 18, 2025, is essentially a grand ambition to break free from the shackles of colonial heritage. Philosophically, this new KUHAP is claimed to be more progressive because it seeks to adapt formal law to the times and the values of restorative justice. However, behind this spirit of reform, there are well-founded concerns from academics and legal practitioners. The main problem does not lie in its technical advancements, but rather in the regulatory loopholes that could become fertile ground for corruption and abuse of power.

Investigation Monopoly and the Danger of Power Concentration

One crucial point that is highlighted is the strengthening of the National Police Investigator's position as the "Main Investigator." In Article 6 paragraph (2) of the new KUHAP, it is emphasized that the National Police holds control over Civil Servant Investigators (PPNS) and other Specific Investigators. This dominance is further clarified in Articles 7 and 8, where all investigation series, including coercive measures such as arrests and detentions, must be coordinated and carried out under the orders of the National Police Investigator.

Theoretically, this integration aims to create uniformity in legal procedures. However, socio-legally, the centralization of power without equivalent checks and balances is a perfect recipe for corruption. When one institution has a full monopoly to determine the "fate" of a case file from another investigator, a space for behind-the-scenes negotiations arises. The potential for extortion to expedite or delay the transfer of case files (P-21) from PPNS to the Public Prosecutor becomes a real risk.

This condition creates a structure that is vulnerable to "trading in influence." If a main investigator has absolute authority to stop or continue a case based on their discretionary rights, then political and economic interests can easily intervene in the legal process. The police institution, which has been struggling with internal integrity issues, is given a greater burden of power, which, if not managed with high transparency, will only expand the space for individuals to commodify cases.