Illusions in Infrastructure Cases

Let's take the example of the management of public funds or infrastructure projects worth hundreds of billions of rupiah. We often find legal dramas where only the PPK, treasurer, and field technical consultants end up in court. They are punished for administrative errors that lead to state losses, while structural actors who design price inflation schemes never once hold suspect status. For the public, this is a worrying message: the law is only sharp on pen holders, but blunt on power holders. This phenomenon is no longer a technical coincidence, but a reflection of the law's failure to map who controls the malicious intent.

More deeply, there is a tendency in our procedural law to prioritize the return of state financial losses above all else. This intention is often misinterpreted as an exit door for perpetrators from prison. Although the aim is to save state assets, in practice this transforms into a kind of "corruption tax". Asset pursuit is positioned as the single variable of success, so that the law loses its pedagogical function to uproot crime from the structure of power.

The impact of this priority is the granting of "privileges" in the form of Investigation Termination Orders (SP3) for structural actors who are willing to return state losses. At this point, the essence of criminal law as the main repressive instrument (primum remedium) in extraordinary crimes is actually reduced to a mere negotiating tool. The use of prosecutorial discretion that is biased towards budget efficiency often ignores aspects of substantive justice (Seno Adji, 2019: 104). Even in court, we see key actors successfully escaping through acquittal verdicts (onslag van rechtsvervolging) on the grounds that their actions are only in the realm of civil or administrative law (Marzuki, 2021: 88).

Failure to Dismantle Power Relations

Law enforcement techniques that only rely on paper trail evidence without the courage to analyze power relations are obsolete techniques. Modern corruption no longer leaves rough traces; policy controllers use legal discretion as a shield. They hide behind the phrase "policies should not be criminalized". In fact, policies taken in violation of the general principles of good governance for personal gain are pure criminal acts, not just maladministration.

This problem is intertwined with prosecution politics that are often politically transactional—not in the sense of monetary bribes, but stability. There is an unwritten agreement not to shake the foundations of power in order to maintain national stability. As a result, an orchestration of law enforcement occurs: enough to give the impression of eradicating corruption, but not to the point of collapsing the system. Prosecutorial discretion is often trapped in a "dark room" without strict accountability (Davis, 1969: 21). The public is presented with a narrative of quantitative success (number of suspects), even though the quality of law enforcement is fragile at the level of substance.

Redesigning Criminal Responsibility

If the problem lies in the legal design and prosecution politics, then the answer should not stop at moral rhetoric. How do we get out of this labyrinth? The proposed idea is to redesign the construction of criminal responsibility in the Anti-Corruption Law.

We must adopt the concept of Command Responsibility into the realm of corruption crimes. In the context of malfeasance, the superior's responsibility for failing to prevent subordinate corruption is a moral necessity of law. This idea can be operationalized through the obligation of active proof of the supervisory function by structural officials. With this construction, failure to prevent corruption is no longer considered administrative negligence, but criminal neglect.

In addition, there needs to be a more radical shift in the burden of proof regarding the assets of public officials, as mandated by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC, 2003: Art. 20) regarding illicit enrichment. We can no longer wait for prosecutors to prove the origin of every rupiah through conventional proof. If there is an extreme imbalance between the official income profile and assets, the burden of proof must be on the asset owner. Law enforcement techniques must also shift to using more aggressive financial intelligence.

Demolishing the Wall of Impunity

In the end, true corruption eradication is not about how many people are sent to prison, but whether we dare to touch the heart of deviant power. The reluctance to touch structural actors is a signal of the collapse of legal authority. The rule of law collapses not when the law is violated, but when the law is deliberately designed so that it never touches the center of power. It is time for us to tear down the wall of impunity built from formalities, and restore the spirit of law as a sword capable of piercing even the highest throne of power. Without correcting the design of the law and the courage to dismantle prosecution politics, corruption eradication will only be a noisy charade on the surface, but empty at the center of power.