This form of abuse of office can arise in various forms, ranging from the use of state equipment for campaign facilities to the issuance of decisions that discriminate against election participants. Essentially, this abuse violates the law and only benefits the supported election participants.

If it is associated with the president's position as a state official, the above reasons become even more relevant. The president holds a position with a high level of power. With that power, he could mobilize all resources to arrange the victory of the presidential candidate he supports.

For this reason, at least in Indonesia, the president is prohibited from taking sides in the election campaign. This is regulated through Article 283 of the Election Law. It is regulated that any form of partiality is prohibited, including meetings, invitations, appeals, calls or giving goods, and applies before, during and after the campaign.

Loopholes in the Rules for a Biased President

In the election campaign, Article 283 of the Election Law does regulate the prohibition for the president to show partiality. However, the president has the right to campaign based on the existence of the right to vote and be elected as regulated in Article 43 paragraph (1) of the Human Rights Law.

The president's right to campaign is regulated in Article 299 of the Election Law. Normatively, this article does not reduce the provisions of Article 283 of the Election Law. As a result, the president can still campaign without showing a biased attitude towards certain election participants.

However, in the previous description, it has been mentioned that the right to vote and be elected applies simultaneously with the right to be partial. For this reason, even if the president claims that he is carrying out a neutral campaign, the potential for him to tend to side with a certain presidential candidate will still exist.

Thus, instead of being a differentiating norm between the right to be partial and the right to campaign, Article 299 of the Election Law actually becomes a norm that has the potential to reach both simultaneously. This article opens a loophole for the president to determine partiality under the guise of exercising his right as a citizen to vote and be elected.

This potential loophole is strengthened by considering 2 things. First, there are no sanctions for presidents who violate the provisions of Article 283 of the Election Law. This is different from ASN or TNI-POLRIstate officials; they can be subject to sanctions according to institutional level regulations.

Second, there is no precedent in Indonesia regarding the imposition of punishment for presidents who take sides in the election campaign. This makes it difficult to file accountability against presidents who are proven to have taken sides, especially in determining the indicators and scope of their partiality.