Legal Literacy - The Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for about 20 percent of global oil supply through its 39-kilometer-wide waters, is now the most obvious battleground between the multilateral order and the law of the jungle. The question is, does international law really work in the Strait of Hormuz when the realities of military power and absolute sovereignty claims clash?

International Law Works, but Has No Fangs

Normatively, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has clearly stipulated that straits used for international shipping such as Hormuz are subject to a transit passage regime. Foreign ships and aircraft are entitled to pass continuously, directly and as quickly as possible without permission from the coastal state.

In the academic world, Brawijaya University International Law of the Sea expert Prof. Dhiana Puspitawati, S.H., LL.M., Ph.D. explained that both the right of transit passage and the right of peaceful passage, based on Articles 24 and 44 of UNCLOS, in principle cannot be terminated or closed.The area, which is geographically included in the territorial sea of Iran and Oman, is legally subject to the transit passage regime according to UNCLOS 1982.According to Article 44 of UNCLOS, the coastal state of a strait must not impede international shipping and must instead ensure security and non-discriminatory access. The closure of the strait by Iran directly contradicts the principle of transit passage, which has been agreed upon by more than 160 countries.

Article 44 of UNCLOS even goes so far as to state: "no coastal state shall impede such transit... nor shall it suspend it even temporarily. "On paper, international law of the sea has a clear answer.

The main problem isenforcement. As highlighted by Todung Mulya Lubis in a Kompas column (1/4/2026), international law is now losing its spurs due to the absence of an implementation mechanismenforcement mechanism), where global norms end up as commodities of speech. In the Strait of Hormuz, paralysis manifests itself in disputes between Transit Passage regimes that are now forced to submit to the subjectivity of increasingly vague self-defense claims.

This problem is exacerbated becauseneither Iran nor the United States have ratified UNCLOS. Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 but has not ratified it. The US also signed but did not ratify. This creates a legal maelstrom, where the two main parties to the conflict are not formally bound to the rules that should be the main reference point.

Iran took advantage of this loophole. As a non-State Party, Iran states that it is not bound by the provisions of UNCLOS and is of the view that the right of transit only applies to states parties to UNCLOS and is not customary international law. Iran considers the Strait of Hormuz to be part of its territorial sea, so the right of passage appliesinnocent passagein Iran's view, the right of peaceful passage authorizes control over these waters.

On the other hand, the US argues that transit passage has become universal customary international law. Prof. Dhiana Puspitawati states that many countries recognize this provision has evolved into a universal customary international lawCustomary International Lawthe UNCLOS has the potential to bind states that do not ratify UNCLOS.

Not just a war of arguments, but a war of ships

The international community largely considers the Strait of Hormuz an international strait with a cross-transit regime. Even UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has called for that "international rights and freedoms of navigation, including in the Strait of Hormuz, must be respected by all parties."

The international community has responded with actions that affirm the functioning of the law, despite its limitations:

  1. IMO Council: On 19 March 2026, the Council of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) strongly condemned Iran's threats and attacks on ships, as well as the closure of the strait, sponsored by more than 115 IMO Member States, the most in IMO history.

  2. UN Security Council: Resolution 2817 (2026) affirms that any attempt to impede the right of transit or freedom of navigation through an international waterway such as the Strait of Hormuz constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.The Security Council held a high-level debate on May 1, 2026 under the chairmanship of Bahrain, reflecting the demands of many countries for the immediate opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

  3. Arab League: In a resolution of its emergency meeting on April 21, 2026, the Arab League condemned Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz and threats to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, stating such actions violate international law and the principle of freedom of navigation.

  4. Compensation Lawsuit: The Arab League also stated Iran bears "full international responsibility" for the attacks targeting Jordan, the US, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Iraq, and is obliged under international law to provide "full indemnification" for all resulting losses and damages.

Deadly Loopholes in the Center of the Power Vortex

The bitter fact remains undeniable that international law in the Strait of Hormuz functions only to the extent that it is supported by the balance of power. Iran selectively closes the strait by claiming the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, especially in the face of unilateral, extraterritorial economic sanctions.

In contemporary international law discourse, there is a strong argument that economic sanctions that cut off a nation's access to global trade can be categorized as "economic aggression." Iran capitalized on this loophole, even drafting tolls under the Hormuz Transit Fee Law passed by the Iranian parliament on March 30, 2026, which imposes tariffs of up to US$2 million per trip for alleged "security and environmental maintenance." However, according to Article 26 of UNCLOS, "no fee may be imposed on foreign vessels solely by reason of their passage through the territorial sea," except for "services actually rendered to the vessel."However, according to Article 26 of UNCLOS, "no charges may be imposed on foreign ships solely by reason of their passage through the territorial sea," except for "services actually rendered to the ship." By framing these tolls as security charges, Iran is trying to find a domestic legal loophole.

Conclusion: Limited Function, Not Absolute

So, does international law work in the Strait of Hormuz?Yes, but the functions are very limited and not self-sustaining.UNCLOS and other international normsserves as a standard of legitimacyhowever, its enforcement mechanisms are weak when faced with military force and political vetoes in the UN Security Council.

Strait of Hormuz phenomenon confirms fears of new definitions emergingself-defensewhich tends tooffensiveit is a world in which "old" international law is deconstructed by absolute national security interests.

The international law of the sea works, but it is only as strong as the political will of its key actors. The optimal functioning of international law demands a consistent shared commitment to the rule of law, not mere selectivity in the name of sovereignty or national security. Without reform of sanctions mechanisms and strengthening of maritime justice institutions, the Strait of Hormuz will continue to be an arena where international law is only respected when it aligns with the interests of its actors.