Analysis of the "17+8" Demands: A Real Test for the Government and DPR's Legal Commitment

Jakarta, LiterasiHukum.com – The massive wave of demonstrations that gave rise to the "17+8" demands has been responded to by the government and the DPR with a number of initial steps, such as sanctions for officers, freezing of council allowances, and cabinet reshuffles. However, the public considers these steps to only scratch the surface of the fundamental roots of the problem. Although the government, through meetings with student representatives at the State Palace, claims to have accepted and is ready to follow up on aspirations, the momentum of the demands is now at a crossroads. The student movement is trying to keep the fire of the struggle burning, while political elites are faced with the complex reality of implementing demands that touch various state institutions. Juridically and politically, fulfilling the "17+8" demands is not a simple matter. These demands involve structural reforms to vital institutions such as the President, the DPR, TNIand National Police, the implementation of which requires complex cross-sectoral coordination and strong political will.

Structural and Political Obstacles

Some demands have a very high level of difficulty and have the potential to conflict with existing government agendas:

1. Independent Investigation Team: The formation of an independent team to investigate police violence is a test of integrity for the National Police, which is in a difficult position as law enforcers and the party being highlighted.
2. TNI Repositioning: The demand to withdraw the TNI from the civilian sphere and "return to the barracks" seems to go against President Prabowo's policy, which is actually strengthening the military posture through the formation of new units and modernization of defense equipment.
3. DPR Reform: This is the most complicated demand. Efforts to fundamentally reform the DPR will directly face the "iceberg" of systemic problems:

• • Domination of Political Parties: The loyalty of DPR members is more often directed to the interests of the party than the constituents. Reforms that disturb the hegemony of the party will receive strong resistance, especially because the financial structure of political parties depends heavily on the dues of its members in parliament.
  • Legislative Conflict of Interest: The DPR will be both the subject and object of reform. Any changes, for example revisions to the MD3 Law, must go through a legislative process in which the reformed institution actually has the power to determine the outcome.
  • Coalition Stability: A government supported by a large coalition tends to prioritize political stability. Pushing for a DPR (People's Representative Council) reform agenda that risks causing internal coalition friction will most likely be avoided.

The "17+8" movement has successfully brought crucial issues to the surface. However, its long-term success will heavily depend on the ability of the civil society movement to transform emotional momentum into consistent and strategic public pressure. Without continuous oversight, reform demands run a significant risk of becoming mere discourse that is difficult to realize. With this access closed for up to five years, the space for public participation in monitoring and verifying candidates becomes very limited. In fact, Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution explicitly states that elections must be held "directly, generally, freely, secretly, honestly, and fairly" – which implicitly requires adequate information disclosure. This article is the result of paraphrasing and in-depth analysis of an opinion article published by Kompas.id on September 14, 2025.